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Thailand-North Korea ties have long escaped international scrutiny since the two countries first 
established diplomatic relations on 8 May 1975. Thai-North Korea friendship and cooperation have 
developed with ups and downs reflecting the prevailing regional and global security environment. North 
Korea was the first communist country to officially recognize Thailand. In the absence of any outstanding 
bilateral disputes, both countries found it easy to get along despite ideological differences that further 
diminished when the Cold War ended. Pyongyang was eager to forge ties with Bangkok to end 
international isolation and counterbalance South Korea’s influence in Southeast Asia. 
 
Some diplomatic hiccups occurred between the 1980s and 2000s that directly complicated relations. 
After the failed attempt by the North Korean Embassy in Bangkok to kidnap one of its staff members 
who planned to defect, bilateral ties plunged. Since then, Bangkok, has refused to consider Pyongyang’s 
requests for additional diplomats to its mission in Thailand. 
 
Still, overall ties were cordial during the 1990s due to Pyongyang’s support of the Thailand-ASEAN 
campaign to drive out Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. In September 2000, Pyongyang asked 
Bangkok to withdraw its miniature flag from the demilitarized zone in Panmunjom. So far, Thailand has 
not complied with the demand, reaffirming that until there is a peace treaty replacing the current 
Armistice agreement, the Thai flag would remain. In 2000 Thailand persuaded North Korea to join 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a regional security framework. However, Thailand’s plan to invite North 
Korea to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Leaders Meeting in Bangkok in 2003 was aborted due to a 
report that emerged at the end of 2003 about a Thai woman, named Anocha Panjoy, allegedly abducted 
by a North Korean secret agent in Macao in 1986. The Thai Foreign Ministry, under pressure from 
human rights groups, Anocha’s family, and the Thai public took up the issue with Pyongyang, which has 
yet to respond. 
 
Before 2006, Thailand and North Korea had among the best bilateral relations in Southeast Asia, with 
strong economic, educational, and agricultural ties and cooperation. Ties weakened when North Korea 
started testing ballistic missiles in July 2006 and conducted its first nuclear test in October that year. 
Along with other ASEAN members, Thailand has been condemning North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
activities and ambitions. After 2006, Thai-North Korea relations were sluggish, with increasing scrutiny 
from the international community. Bilateral trade between 2014 and 2017 decreased to $9.9 million — a 
pittance in comparison with other trading partners. Thailand imported scrap iron, raw silk, and medicine 
from North Korea. In return, it exported food stuffs and computer and machine parts. 
 
However, with the latest development in US-North Korean relations and improving inter-Korea ties, 
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Despite the historic summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un in 
June 2018, the US government continued sanctions pressure against North Korea including via Southeast Asian 
countries—some of which still have not closed all the loopholes in implementing relevant UN Security Council 
resolutions on sanctions against Pyongyang. The last half of 2018 witnessed a series of shuttle diplomacy visits by 
senior US officials to North Korea’s key trading partners—including to Thailand on December 16 by Special 
Representative for North Korea Joseph Yun. Yun strongly urged Thailand to play a constructive role in the US 
standoff with North Korea and at the same time assert maximum pressure by downgrading ties with Pyongyang. 
Specifically, the Trump administration pressed hard for Thailand to strengthen its sanctions regime under relevant 
United Nations Security Council resolutions, particularly on trade and financial measures. 
 
Even earlier, and in the context of a dramatically improved Thai-US relationship under President Trump’s 
administration, Thailand readily agreed to abide by Washington’s request to stop trading with North Korea. During 
the first nine months of 2017, bilateral trade was a mere $1.61 million, a 94% drop from the same period in 2016, 
equivalent to a tiny 0.0004% of Thailand’s total trade. The Thai military administration promised to sever all exports 
and investment by the first quarter of 2018. 
 
To further show solidarity with the United States, Thailand joined 19 other countries at the Foreign Ministerial 
Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula in Vancouver co-hosted by Canada and the United States 
on January 15-16, 2018. This was a high-level meeting to increase pressure on North Korea to implement its pledges 
on denuclearization. At the meeting, Thailand stressed the importance of diplomacy and continued dialogue with 
Pyongyang. In line with the international community, Thailand would not recognize North Korea as a nuclear 
power, reaffirming that its ongoing nuclear weapons program was considered a global security threat. 
 
As the current 2019 ASEAN chair, Thailand can engage North Korea both bilaterally and via the ASEAN-led 
mechanism. At the first informal ASEAN foreign ministerial retreat in Chiangmai on January 17-18, 2019, Thailand 
and ASEAN were quick to welcome the latest positive developments on the Korean Peninsula and the prospect of a 
second Trump-Kim summit planned for the end of February. ASEAN leaders also welcomed various initiatives and 
efforts by South Korea, the United States, and China to promote dialogue with North Korea and the latter’s 
commitment to complete denuclearization including refraining from further nuclear and missile tests. The ASEAN 
retreat’s statement also took note of international efforts to bring about the complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 
 
Thailand and ASEAN have already crafted their unique role in trying to ease tensions between Washington and 
Pyongyang. ASEAN members such as Singapore — which was the venue of the first Trump-Kim summit — and 
Vietnam, which could be the venue for the second summit, showed the bloc’s constructive role in facilitating the 
denuclearization process and helping reduce tensions in East Asia. In April 2017, North Korea appealed to ASEAN to 
help ease tensions with the United States. 
 
While ASEAN might halt trading with Pyongyang, the bloc continues to pursue dialogue through diplomatic 
channels. Thailand-North Korea ties will continue to evolve and grow in strength if Pyongyang is committed to 
denuclearization pledges, as outlined in the Panmunjom Declaration and the Trump-Kim joint statement. If there is 
tangible progress on denuclearization, the ASEAN chair could invite the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to 
Bangkok for a gathering with other global leaders as part of the bloc’s year-end summit.  
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